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Abstract
We examine misconduct in Önancial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract
surplus based on the value of their Örmís brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data
for insurance agents, we Önd that agents working exclusively for large branded Örms are more
likely to be the subject of justiÖed sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts,
despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more
complaints per year.
Keywords: Misconduct, expert services, asymmetric information, credence goods, insur-
ance, ethics.
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ì... will people push the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to
clients even if they are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned
with the clientís goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.î
- Greg Smith, former executive at Goldman Sachs
New York Times Op-Ed (March 14, 2012)
Expert services Örms often advise customers in markets with substantial asymmetric infor-
mation problems; however, with these asymmetries comes the potential for expert misconduct.
SpeciÖcally, while experts beneÖt from customers trusting their recommendations, these experts
may also face incentives to provide misleading advice for their own gain. For example, investment
or insurance advisors can recommend and sell products that o§er customers fewer beneÖts, but
provide themselves with greater revenue than the customersí ideal products.
Whereas previous research has explored how employee misconduct is ináuenced by individu-
alsí gender, personality and moral di§erences (OíFallon & ButterÖeld 2005; McCabe, Ingram and
Dato-on 2006; Greenberg 2002), the division of labor and goal setting within the Örm (Ross 2013;
Schweitzer, OrdÛÒez and Douma 2004) and Örmsí codes of ethics, human resource practices and
culture (Grojean, Resick, Dickson and Smith 2004; Werbel and Balkin 2010; Ashforth and Anand
2003; Pierce and Snyder 2008), we present theoretical and empirical evidence about expertsí propen-
sity to engage in misconduct in di§erent organizations when they face Öxed prices. SpeciÖcally,
we develop a formal model to consider di§erences in the incentives for malfeasance for experts
working exclusively for large branded Örms versus those working as independent sellers. Interest
in these settings is motivated by their empirical prevalenceómany Önancial services experts face
Öxed prices and commission rates while operating under one of the two prominent organizational
structures. We also consider expertsí professional experience, known to ináuence the propensity to
engage in deceptive practices (Edelman and Larkin 2014).
The assumptions of the theory model reáect realistic features of expert services markets, par-
ticularly the market for Önancial advice and products. For example, in our model, when experts
have identical underlying honesty, customers using exclusive agents fare better in expectation than
customers using independent agents. In practice, experts working exclusively for large branded
companies often enjoy more brand equity, o§er additional services and support, and may be more
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heavily monitored by supervisors. Experts who provide larger expected consumer beneÖts may not
be able to extract this surplus directly; instead, they may extract surplus through greater miscon-
duct. The model provides similar intuition for understanding the role of expert experience. When
expertsí are equally honest, customers using more experienced experts may enjoy higher expected
payo§s because these experts are less prone to mistakes. However, in equilibrium, some experienced
experts may try to appropriate these beneÖts through greater misconduct.
To assess the empirical relevance of the hypotheses derived from the theory framework, we
present an analysis of data from the insurance industry and show evidence that misconduct rates
vary with expert sellersí a¢liations and experience. Consistent with the testable hypotheses of
the formal model, exclusive agents selling life insurance and annuities face more justiÖed com-
plaints than independent agents, and the disparity is not explained by di§erences in market share.
Moreover, more experienced agents have greater per year complaint rates than less experienced
agents.
Although complaints are an imperfect measure of misconduct, data summarizing accusations
investigated by a state insurance regulator o§er us a window into actual misconduct. In general,
studies of misconduct face a trade-o§: direct observation of misconduct through Öeld experiments
is necessarily limited in scale, while administrative data on reported misconduct may su§er from
selection biases. Our main data set from a state regulator includes cases that have been reported
and investigated. We take advantage of the observation of both accusations and conÖrmed cases of
misconduct and Önd that our main results are robust to reporting and selection biases.
By exploring the link between misconduct, organizations and expertsí experience, our paper
addresses issues at the core of managersí and policymakersí concerns about vulnerable consumers in
Önancial and other expert services markets. Our results suggest that price-taking expertsí incentives
for malfeasance are nuanced and misconduct is not just a theoretical possibilityóconcerns about
misconduct have empirical support. Moreover, our work suggest a dark side to brand equity in
markets where sellers cannot extract additional surplus through the price.
While our work focuses on di§erence in misconduct across seller types, others studies have ex-
plored the prevalence of misconduct in the Önancial services market. Mullainathan, Noeth, and
Schoar (2012) conduct a Öeld audit study in a U.S. market and Önd that Önancial advisors often
recommend self-serving products. Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012) conduct an audit study of insur-
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ance sales agents in India and Önd similar results. Even Önancial experts themselves acknowledge
the ethical quandary of their Öeld. In Cooper and Frank (2005), a survey of insurance agents Önds
that agents consistently identify ethical issues relating to the conáicts between customer beneÖts
and opportunities for personal Önancial gain. We contribute to the discussion of misconduct in
these markets by providing a stylized model of misconduct that explains our observations in life
insurance and annuities sales.
Our empirical work focuses on the life insurance and annuities market, but the Öndings may be
of wider interest. Financial services are but one example of a market in which it is di¢cult for a
customer to determine whether the product or service is the best match for his or her needs; for
example, drivers rely on mechanicsí expertise and patients rely on physiciansí advice and treat-
ment. As a result, an expert who both advises and receives revenue based on his advice faces
conáicting incentives. High quality advice may improve the customerís payo§; yet, when taken by
the customer, inappropriate advice may lead to higher expert revenue.
It is important to note that the information asymmetries in our theoretical and empirical settings
cannot be fully resolved through reputation building.1 Indeed, in its extreme, the nature of these
expert services markets means that misconduct is seldom observed; therefore, the signals required
for reputation building on this dimension are not su¢ciently informative (Mailath and Samuelson
2001). As a result, it is not possible to build a reputation explicitly for ethical behavior in settings in
which consumers rarely observe true quality.2 Curiously, however, we still observe strong branding
by Örms in many expert services settingsófor example, insurance companies, wirehouses, and
hospital networks are often heavily advertised. These brands may build consumersí conÖdence
in a product or seller; yet individual agents may exploit the value that consumers place on the
large branded Örms to extract surplus through misconduct. While branding and reputation solve
informational asymmetry in many markets, in our proposed model, the correlation between strong
branding and higher additional surplus leads to the prediction that experts from large, branded
1Here, we consider the reputation of the individual agent, not the organization by which he or she is employed.
In contrast to the broad literature on unethical behavior at the organizational level (e.g., Robinson and Bennet 1995;
OíLeary-Kelly, Gri¢n, and Glew 1996; Robinson and OíLeary-Kelly 1998), we contribute to the literature studying
individual employeesí misconduct (e.g., Kidder 2005). Consistent with the approach in Werbel and Balkin (2010),
we limit our study to considering misconduct that aims to enrich the employee without intentionally causing harm
to the Örm or its workers (Charness, Masclet and Villeval 2013).
2 In environments in which customers can readily observe product quality, customer reviews may resolve some
information asymmetries (Kalra, Shi and Srinivasan 2003).
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Örms are actually more likely to engage in misconduct. In that sense, our results provide an
interesting counterpoint to the conventional view of brand- and reputation-building as mechanisms
that encourage experts to act in the interest of their clients.
Much of the work studying experts facing relatively naive consumers allows experts to ad-
just both the quality and the price of their service (Pessendorfer and Wolinsky 2003; Sulzle and
Wambach 2005; Alger and Salanie 2006; Emons 1997; Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny 2012). In
contrast to these studies, we explore a market with price-taking experts. The literature has also
considered the importance of customer heterogeneity (cf. Fong 2005; Feddersen and Gilligan 2001;
Taylor 1995; Inderst and Ottaviani 2009) or environments in which the expert aims to maximize
customersí payo§s (Lightle 2009). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) present a model that uniÖes
the extant theory literature and rationalizes many of the previous theoretical Öndings. Our work
complements these studies by adapting a market-level model of price-taking experts to explore the
role of customer heterogeneity.
Despite the challenges, several empirical studies have examined experts decisions about what
quality to provide and what price to charge their relatively uninformed customers. Hubbard (1998,
2002) Önds that independent automotive service shops are more likely to provide favorable auto-
motive emissions tests, relative to chain shops with non-owner managers. Bennett et al. (2013)
Önd that increased competition also leads to more lenient emissions testing. Levitt and Syver-
son (2008) Önd that real estate agents invest more e§ort and secure higher prices for their own
properties, relative to their customersí homes. We build on these empirical papers by exploring
another important industry setting in which, unlike with vehicle inspectors and real-estate agents,
experts face rigid commission rates. Whereas we focus on life insurance sales, other examples of
price-taking experts include physicians with limited scope to adjust prices for speciÖc patients and
experts facing formally regulated prices.
1 A model of expert misconduct
We develop a formal model of consumers and experts that allows us to focus on two dimensions
of expert services markets. First, we aim to understand if and how market-level misconduct varies
across two common types of organizations. To that end, we compare misconduct from experts
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who work exclusively for large companies and independent experts who form their own small Örms.
Second, we consider how misconduct varies across experts with di§erent levels of professional ex-
perience.
1.1 Model set-up
Consider an interaction between an expert and a customer that can result in two outcomes: the
expert can recommend either an appropriate or inappropriate product. For convenience, we use the
index ìRî and ìWî as mnemonics for the ìrightî and ìwrongî products, respectively. We assume
that the expert knows which product is appropriate for the customer, but the customer does not.
After the expert makes his product recommendation, the customer must chose to buy or not to
buy. The timeline for the expert-customer interaction is sequential and depicted below.
Suppose that payo§ #t is a reduced form representation of the net payo§ (i.e., gross revenue
minus business expenses) of selling product t 2 fR;Wg; before any possible penalty for mis-selling
to a customer (i.e., recommending W ).
An expertís private cost of misconduct, penalty k; can be framed as his willingness to take ad-
vantage of a customer. Let k be drawn from a commonly known distribution F (%) :3 In equilibrium,
there is some chance b that the expert will face a customer who acts on his recommendation. Thus,
taking b as given, the probability that an expert suggests W to a customer is
Pr
!
b#W & k ' b#R" = F !b !#W & #R"" ( s(b)
where s (b) is the market-wide misconduct rate. To allow for the possibility of misconduct, we
assume F (0) = 0:
Now suppose that the customer earns a net payo§ V R or V W from buying R orW , respectively,
where V W < 0 < V R. If the customer decides not to buy the product, then her payo§ is her
3Tenbrunsel (1998) suggests that variation in individualsí ethical standards and Önancial needs leads to hetero-
geneous sensitivities to incentives for misconduct.
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normalized outside option, 0. Hence, a customer will buy if
sV W + (1& s)V R ' 0:
We deÖne a customerís payo§ ratio as V
R
!VW (recall that V
W < 0), which is distributed according
to G (%) : Hence, the probability that a particular customer buys is
Pr
!
sV W + (1& s)V R ' 0" = Pr# V R&V W ' s(1& s)
$
=) 1&G
#
s
(1& s)
$
( b(s)
where b (s) is the market-wide buy rate.
To Önd the market equilibrium, we Önd the Öxed point such that s(b (s)) = s:
1.2 Exclusive versus independent experts
We next enrich the model by considering two di§erent organizational structures: experts may work
exclusively for large companies or as independent experts who form their own small Örms. We
index these experts with m 2 fE; Ig.
We assume that the price-taking experts face similar payo§s across the organizations
!
#t = #tI = #
t
E
"
;
however, payo§s to customers vary across Örm types. Consistent with features of our empirical set-
ting, customers gain additional payo§ from working with exclusive experts a¢liated with branded
Örms.
Consumersí payo§s
Di§erences between exclusive and independent agents, in terms of both branding and o§erings,
motivate the wedge between the consumersí payo§s from each type of organization. Brand can
communicate to consumers both tangible and intangible attributes that di§erentiate goods (cf.
Keller 1993; Keller and Lehmann 2006) and often reinforces positive features (Cobb-Walgren et
al. 1995). Evidence that consumers pay a brand premium has been found across many product
categories, and non-expert consumers are more likely to assign the premium than expert buyers
(e.g. in Önancial markets (Billett, Jiang and Rego 2014) and for pharmacy and grocery products
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(Bronnenberg et al. 2014)).4
Consumers also may enjoy higher payo§s from the products available exclusively through
branded sellers or from the breadth of services o§ered.5 Finally, consumers may believe that
the severity of misconduct is less when expertsí conduct is overseen by branch managers.6
In the formal model, to capture the wedge between customersí payo§s from di§erent organization
forms, we assume that V
R
E
!VWE
=
V RI
!VWI
1 >
V RI
!VWI
; where 1 > 1:
Consumersí buy rates
Given the di§erence in consumersí payo§s between the organizations, the probability that a
customer purchases from an exclusive expert is
1&GE
#
s
1 (1& s)
$
( bE(s)
and the probability that a customer purchases from an independent expert is7
1&GI
#
s
(1& s)
$
( bI(s)
The market-wide equilibria is identiÖed most easily through a graphical analysis.8 In Figure
1, we plot expert misconduct against customer buy rates. As expected, buy rates are decreasing
functions of market-wide misconduct. SpeciÖcally, the solid downward sloping line, bI (s) ; plots
the buy rate for customers of independent experts. The dotted line, bE (s) ; plots the buy rate for
customers of exclusive experts. For all interior points, bE (s) lies above bI (s). Intuitively, for a
given level of market-wide misconduct, customers will buy at a higher rate from exclusive experts
because they receive a higher expected payo§. The upward sloping line, s (b)!1 ; is the inverse of
4Although a full discussion of why brand premia persist over time is beyond the scope of the current paper,
consumers purchase life insurance and annuities very infrequently and, therefore, have limited opportunities to accu-
mulate knowledge about speciÖc products or update their beliefs about Örmsí reputations.
5 In the insurance market, exclusive agents may o§er multi-product discounts, online account access, 1-800 tele-
phone support, or multiple service locations. In principle, consumers in the insurance market could access and analyze
the public complaints data and conclude that they should avoid particular agent types. It may also be the case that
some consumers may not be as sensitive to branding and marketing. However, objective di§erences in branded Örmsí
product o§erings and services may provide su¢cient incentive for consumers to still prefer the branded Örms.
6To narrow our focus to the misconduct of individual Önancial advisors, we take insurance companiesí reputations,
prices, product o§erings, and organizational structures as given. Although questions about reputation-building,
pricing and personnel decisions at the Örm level is beyond the scope of this paper, the interaction of Örm choices and
sales agentsí behavior is an important area of future research.
7 In this model, buy rates are not equivalent to market shares and, indeed, need not even be correlated.
8Formal proofs for all of the hypotheses are available in the Appendix.
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the market-wide misconduct rate. It slopes up because there is more market-wide misconduct when
customers are more likely to purchaseómore experts will Önd it proÖtable to take advantage of
customers when customers are keen to buy.9 The intersections of these curves identify the equilibria
and lead to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 Exclusive experts are more likely to engage in misconduct than independent
experts.
1.3 Observable di§erences in expertsí skill
Consider a version of the model where, on occasion, experts inadvertently recommend the inappro-
priate product. Assume that experts vary in terms of ability and sometimes make harmful mis-
takes.10 In practice, regulators often view intentional and unintentional actions di§erently, where
unintentional mistakes are not considered misconduct. Experts may also choose to recommend the
inappropriate product, and these acts qualify as professional misconduct.
Let h be the commonly known probability that an expert makes an error. Now, the probability
that a particular customer buys is
Pr
%
sV W + (1& s) !(1& h)V R + hV W " ' 0& = Gh# s+ (1& s)h
(1& s) (1& h)
$
=) 1&Gh
#
s+ (1& s)h
(1& s) (1& h)
$
( bh(s)
We present a graphical analysis of the market-wide consequence of error-prone experts in Figure
2. Let a be expertsí error rate. The customer buy rate from experts who makes errors, presented
as the downward-sloping solid line bh=a(s); lies above the customer buy rate from experts with
an error rate greater than a; shown as the downward-sloping dotted line bh>a(s): All else equal,
a customer is less likely to buy from a more error-prone expert. Consequently, in equilibrium,
experts with lower error rates engage in more misconduct. We summarize this Önding in our next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 More error-prone experts are less likely to engage in misconduct.
9A version of the model in which the penalty k is a function of the misconduct rate s yields similar results.
10For simplicity, we assume that experts cannot intend to recommend W and mistakenly recommend R.
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Hypothesis 2 generates a corollary that is consistent with Edelman and Larkinís (2014) Önding
that more experienced professionals are more likely to engage in deceptive practices:
Corollary for Hypothesis 2 If the error rate is negatively correlated with experience, more
experienced experts engage in more misconduct.
2 Life insurance: Industry background
Life insurance and annuities are complicated and multidimensional products, and it can be di¢cult
for even sophisticated consumers to identify the appropriate policy for their needs. Insurers o§er
multiple ìridersî and modiÖcations that may be opaque to customers. For example, life insurance
policies can be term, universal, whole, variable and variable universal, with terminal illness and
disability waivers, long-term care provisions, and accidental death beneÖts.11 Customers may
be sold inappropriate products but may never become aware of sellersí misconduct or mistakes.
Moreover, insured customers and their beneÖciaries may never learn whether there existed superior
products in the market at the time of the purchases.
Although agents can suggest products for speciÖc needs, they cannot adjust the prices faced by
individual customersóthis practice, called ìrebating,î is illegal in most jurisdictions.12 Instead,
insurance agents can enhance their commissions by recommending inappropriate products to cus-
tomers. Increased revenue can come from simply overselling the level of insurance or from selling
products with a higher commission rates and lower beneÖts to buyers.
Commission rates vary signiÖcantly across and within product types (e.g. commissions on
annuities range are 2 to 10% of the invested amount) and are rarely disclosed to customers.13
In general, the trade-o§ between the beneÖts to policyholders and the revenue for the sellers is
substantial. For example, a so-called ìbonusî annuity earns an additional interest rate in the Örst
year that is negatively correlated with the commission rate.
11The National Association of Insurance Commissions publishes a buyersí guide that describes some of the product
complexities (http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_life.pdf).
12 Importantly, rebating is illegal in our data environment (Texas Insurance Code Chapter 1806, Section 53).
13Our commission rate estimates and discussion of monitoring within Örms are based on personal communication
with professional insurance agents working as both exclusive and independent sellers (see Section 2.1 for a description
of these organizational structures).
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2.1 Types of organizations
Life insurance salespeople work primarily under the two di§erent organizational structures: (1)
sellers may work exclusively for large, branded insurance companies; or (2) sellers may work as
independent experts who are not a¢liated with any single insurance company.
Exclusive agents
Exclusive company agents are typically a¢liated with only one insurance company and may
market only approved products from that company.14 Firmsí product lists are quite large in prac-
tice, and there is little concern that exclusive agents are too constrained in terms of available
products. Insurance companies using exclusive agents may o§er employment beneÖts packages and
provide introductory training to inexperienced agents. In many cases, new agents receive guaran-
teed salaries that phase out as they build up ìbooksî of business, typically over 12 to 24 months.
Multiple exclusive agents in a city or region often share the same o¢ce space and administrative
sta§. The hierarchy within these o¢ces provides some level of supervision; for example, branch
managers may oversee and approve large or complicated transactions.
Exclusive agents may earn 50 to 70% of the gross commission on their sales, depending on the
type of insurance product. State Farm, Farmers Insurance, Allstate, Northwestern Mutual and
New York Life are examples of Örms using the exclusive agent model15; in general, these Örms have
well-known brand names.16
Independent agents
Independent agents are not a¢liated with any single insurance company. While independent
agents are not restricted to selling insurance from any particular company, they usually cannot
market products from insurance companies that use exclusive agents. For example, independent
agents cannot sell State Farm products. Independent agents are often ìone agent shops,î and
their transactions are not overseen by managers or supervisors. Typically, independent agents
are responsible for all of their expenses; however, they generally earn close to 100% of the gross
14These agents may also be authorized to market selected products from other companies through agreements
between their primary company and other Örms.
15For a list of Örms by organizational structure, see A.M. Best Companyís ìBestís Key Rating Guide: Life/Health
United State & Canada.î (2011).
16 In 2010, State Farm, AXA, Allstate and Metropolitan Life appeared in Brandzís report on
the top eight most valuable global brands in the insurance industry (report available online at
http://c1547732.cdn.cloudÖles.rackspacecloud.com/BrandZ_Top100_2010.pdf).
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commissions on their sales.
For a given amount of business, after accounting for expenses, exclusive and independent agents
earn roughly the same net commissions (Carson et al. 2007).
2.2 Misconduct
Both exclusive and independent agents can engage in various types of misconduct. In this paper,
we focus on sales-level misconduct over which individual agents have control. Note that we are not
considering misconduct by the insurance company, such as the unfair denial of claims.
Table 1 presents a summary of common categories of sales misconduct and complaints. Agents
can pocket the policy premium and provide the customer with fraudulent insurance documents
(ìconversionî). Misleading advertising about policy features and the misrepresentation of insurance-
related information by an agent are also considered misconduct. Since the bulk of total commissions
is earned in the Örst year of many life insurance policies, agents beneÖt from frequent policy changes.
ìChurningî describes when the agent induces a customer to (unnecessarily) cash out his existing
policy in order to purchase a new policy from the same insurance company. ìTwistingî is similar,
but involves an unnecessary switch to a new policy from a di§erent insurance company. Agents
may o§er unauthorized rewardsóin the form of payments, favors, or other advantagesóto induce
a client to purchase a new policy or product (ìimproper inducementî). Agents may illegally bun-
dle products by refusing to sell or renew a customerís policy unless the client agrees to purchase
additional lines of coverage (e.g. life insurance tied to home or auto insurance). These examples
of misconduct are not exhaustive: Unauthorized acts and other agent-level mishandling are other
broad categories of agent-level misconduct.
Under U.S. law, insurance advisors are legally bound by ìduty of careî and ìduty of loyaltyî;
the former requires agents to recommend appropriate products and the latter restricts agents from
enriching themselves at their clientsí expense. Under these duties, an advisor holds greater liability
in the case of an intentional mistake, relative to the case in which he or she inadvertently o§ered
a client a sub-optimal product. Under the ìbest e§ortî rule, advisors who present themselves as
more experienced may also be held to a higher standard.17
17For an illustrative legal case, see Bloor v. Falsta§ Brewing Corp., 601. F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1979).
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2.3 Regulation
A state-level regulatoróin our empirical setting, the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI)ó
oversees insurance-related business, including life insurance and annuities sales. Among its many
responsibilities, the TDI is charged with enforcing state insurance laws and ensuring the fair treat-
ment of consumers.
Complaints against insurance agents, agencies and companies can be Öled with the TDI through
a web-based form or by mail, fax, or email.18 The regulator then investigates and determines
whether the agent or company violated the terms of the contract or broke state insurance law.
If the complaint is deemed justiÖed, the regulator can impose sanctions as outlined in the state
insurance code.
State insurance code (Texas Insurance Code, Title 13, Chapter 4005, Section 101) considers in-
tentionality. Indeed, the code states that only willful violations of insurance law will be disciplined.
For example, regarding the misrepresentation of policy terms, the code states that it is ì...an unfair
or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance to knowingly permit the making of, o§er to
make, or make a life insurance contract... other than as plainly expressed in the issued contract...î
Thus, unintentional errors do not generally result in justiÖed sales complaints, whereas intentional
misrepresentation or mistreatment leads to justiÖed complaints.
3 Data
Using multiple public sources, we compiled licensing, appointment, complaint, and market share
data for the Texas insurance market. The data set covers the population of life insurance agents
operating in the state in 2010 and reported incidents of sales misconduct from 1996 to 2010.
3.1 Agents
The agent licensing data from the TDI include all individuals who were licensed to sell insurance
in Texas in 2010. A unique agent identiÖer and the date on which the agent was Örst licensed in
the state is available for 174,792 insurance agents.
18Our telephone conversations with representatives at the TDI suggest that most complaints come from individual
customers.
12
To identify the type of organization under which individual agents operate, we match Örm and
agent a¢liation data from two sources. Firm-level data from A.M. Best identify insurance compa-
nies that use exclusive agents and those that sell through independent agents.19 TDI appointments
data for the Örms using exclusive agents list all agents who are allowed to sell products the Örmsí
products. We match license holders to Örms and, thus, characterize individual agentsí a¢liations.
We identify 56,314 individuals who work as exclusive agents (32% of licensees in the state) and
assume that the balance work as independent agents.
Marketshare data from the TDI describe the in-state total premiums written for all insurance
companies operating in Texas. Table 2 reports separately the premium and marketshare statistics
for companies using exclusive and independent agents. While Örms using independent agents
hold the majority of the marketshare, premia per agent are approximately equal for exclusive
and independent agents.20
3.2 Complaints
The TDIís public directory of complaints against insurance companies, agents and agencies describes
more than 500,000 complaints Öled between 1996 and 2010. The directory reports the date and
nature of the complaint, the line of coverage, the name and license number of the subjects of the
complaint, and whether the complaint was deemed ìjustiÖedî or ìunjustiÖedî by the TDI.
Complaints vary considerably, from claims disputes to accusations of unfair cancellations. Many
complaints, even those leveled at agents, relate to actions under the control of insurance companies
(e.g., denial of claims and premium-related complaints). To focus on agentsí misconduct in the
sale of products about which typical consumers have particularly weak insight, we narrow our
analysis to complaints about agentsí sales practices.21 In total, we identify 5,406 accusations of
sales misconduct leveled against 3,707 individuals present in our 2010 licensing data. In total, the
TDI found that 1,962 sales complaints (approximately 36% of the total) were justiÖed.
19 In A.M. Best Companyís ìBestís Key Rating Guide: Life/Health United State & Canada.î (2011), this variable
is labeled as a companyís ìmarketing type.î
20 In their seminal work on property rights theory, Grossman and Hart (1986) apply their model to the insurance
industry. They predict that Örms using exclusive agents will hold the majority of marketshare in life insurance. Their
predictions align with the insurance industry structure in the early 1980s, when independent Örms had only 12% of
the life insurance market. Data from Texas suggest that these marketshares may have shifted in recent years.
21We exclude complaints relating to property and casualty products, medicare supplements and employment
insurance sales, and those referred to other agencies for investigation. The TDIís records do not distinguish between
complaints about life insurance and complaints about annuities.
13
Figure 3 presents the distribution of total and justiÖed complaints per agent by agent type.
There are several things to note in the Ögure. First, exclusive agents face more total and more
justiÖed complaints than independent sellersówhereas 1,133 of the justiÖed complaints are against
exclusive agents, only 829 justiÖed complaints are against independent agents. It does not appear
that exclusive agents accumulate more complaints because they enjoy a higher volume of business.
As noted above and in Table 2, Örms using exclusive agents have much lower total marketshare
by premiums written, relative to independent Örms (17% versus 83%). Exclusive agents receive
roughly 35% more complaints, yet do only one-Öfth of the business as measured by marketshare.
Second, complaints are rare events for both exclusive and independent agents. Only 2.75% of
exclusive agents and 0.91% of independent agents are the subject of any complaint Öled with the
TDI; only 1.44% of exclusive agents and 0.53% of independent agents are named in a justiÖed
complaint. The infrequency with which complaints are Öled highlights the di¢culties that honest
agents may face in building a reputation for ethical behavior in this setting.
Third, conditional on being the subject of any justiÖed complaint, most agents receive only one
complaintó82% of exclusive agents and 84% of independent agents with any conÖrmed misconduct
face only one complaint in the sample.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of complaints against exclusive and independent agents by
agentsí experience, as measured by the years between when agents were Örst licensed and when
they received a justiÖed complaint. We exclude agents with less than three years experience as of
2010, since their complaints may not yet have been processed by the TDI. The Ögure suggests that
exclusive and independent agents do not face justiÖed complaints only in their Örst years of service.
Instead, relatively experienced agentsóeven those with more than 20 years in the industryóare still
subject to justiÖed complaints. Figure 5 also suggests that exclusive agents receive more complaints
later in their careers, relative to independent agents (p < 0:01for a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of
equality).
These Ögures are suggestiveócomplaints seem to vary systematically with agent type and ex-
perience. We account for more factors in the regression analysis presented in the next section and
explore alternative explanations in Section 5.
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4 Results
Are exclusive agents more likely to have been the subject of a justiÖed complaint, relative to
independent agents? To address this question, we estimate the following equation:
Pr (Complainti = 1) =
1
1 + e!Qi
(1)
where Complainti equals 1 when agent i has been the subject of at least one justiÖed complaint
and where
Qi = =Exclusivei + BXi
where Exclusivei equals 1 when agent i is an exclusive agent and 0 if the agent is independent,
and matrix Xi contains the control variables described below. Although the main thrust of our
analysis concerns di§erences between exclusive and independent agents, the predictions from the
model also speak to the role of agent experience.
Complaints against life insurance and annuities agents occur very infrequently in the Texas
dataófewer than 2% of agents have been the subject of a justiÖed complaint. Since typical econo-
metric techniques may underestimate the probability of rare events, we employ a rare-events cor-
rection (King and Zeng 2001a, 2001b).
We include the following controls in Xi; summarized in Table 3:
Years since Örst licensed: As a proxy for agent experience, we calculate the years since an
agent was Örst licensed to sell insurance in Texas. If agents were previously licensed in other states,
then we will underestimate their professional experience; if agents instead allowed their licenses
to lapse for interim periods, then we will overestimate their experience.22 On average, exclusive
agents have been licensed longer than independent agents (p < 0:01), holding licenses for roughly
10.5 years and 7 years, respectively.
Out-of-state agent: All agents who market insurance in Texas must be licensed by the TDI;
however, they may be physically located in another state. We use the address on agentsí licenses to
determine residency and include an indicator for agents outside of Texas. More independent agents
have out-of-state business addresses, relative to exclusive agents (p < 0:01).
22We exclude the 1.5% of agents for whom licensing dates are not available.
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Professional designation: Insurance agents may seek certiÖcation from several professional
organizations, which typically require members to complete course work, pass exams, and partic-
ipate in continuing education. We match agents to member lists for 11 designations.23 In our
empirical analysis, we include an indicator for agents with any professional designation. Very few
sellers have professional credentials; however, slightly more exclusive agents hold an accreditation,
relative to independent agents (p < 0:01).
Number of licenses: Although most agents are licensed to sell only one type of insurance,
we include an indicator for agents licensed to sell other products (e.g. property and casualty
insurance) along with life insurance and annuities. Independent agents are more likely to specialize
in life insurance and annuities sales (p < 0:01).
Local population: Using a distance algorithm, we calculate the distance between the geo-
graphic centroids of all Texas ZIP codes and match ZIP codes to population data from the U.S.
Census Bureau. We identify all ZIP codes within 25 miles of every agentís business address (for
Texas residents) and aggregate ZIP code populations. Unfortunately, we are not able to map non-
resident agents to any speciÖc geographic region of Texas. For residents, there is little di§erence
between the average local populations faced by exclusive and independent agents.
4.1 Exclusive versus independent agents
Table 4 reports estimation results from equation (1). To ease interpretation, we also report odds
ratios. Each observation represents a unique agent. The regression reported in column 4.1 of
Table 4 includes all agents in the data for whom information is available and includes controls for
experience, professional credentials, residency, and licensing. The estimates suggest that exclusive
agents are more likely to have received a justiÖed complaint than independent agents (p < 0:01).
Even before adjusting for the very unequal marketshares of Örms using exclusive and independent
agentsórecall that, aggregating life insurance and annuities, exclusive agents do nearly Öves times
less business than independent agentsóthe odds of an exclusive agent being the subject of a justiÖed
complaint are roughly 73% higher than for an independent agent.
In column 4.2, we exclude agents with less than three years of experience as of 2010, since these
inexperienced agents may be still in their training period, may earn a guaranteed ìtrainingî salary,
23The designations are CFP, ChFC, CLU, CAP, CASL, CLF, FSS, LUTCF, MSFS, MSM, and REBC.
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or may not yet be responsible for generating their own sales. Excluding these agents does little to
change the coe¢cient of interestóthe di§erence between exclusive and independent agents remains
large (p < 0:01).
Both local and out-of-state agents can be licensed to market insurance products in Texas, and
one might wonder if the observed di§erence is being driven by residency. Column 4.3 reports a
regression that includes only agents who reside in Texas. The estimated coe¢cient on the indicator
for exclusive agents is similar in magnitude to the other speciÖcations.
Agents may face di§erent potential volumes of business, depending on their location. Although
agent-level data on the volume or value of transactions are not available, we proxy for these measures
using ZIP code-level U.S. Census population data. In column 4.4, this measure of business volume
is positive and very small in magnitude (p < 0:01): Its inclusion has little e§ect on the coe¢cient
of interest.
4.2 Years of experience
Across the four speciÖcations reported in Table 4, one additional year of agent experience is asso-
ciated with a 4 to 7 percentage points increase in the odds of receiving a complaint. Of course,
agents with more experience have had more opportunities to receive a complaint. In this section, we
present evidence that longevity alone cannot explain the estimated relationship between experience
and complaints.
In Table 5, we present results of a Tobit speciÖcation with a measure of misconduct normalized
by agentsí experienceócomplaints per licensed yearóas the dependent variable. Column 5.1 of
Table 5 excludes agents with less than three years of experience. Since we have only Öfteen years
of complaints data, we consider only agents with three to Öfteen years of experience in column 5.2.
In column 5.3, we further the restrict the sample to Texas resident agents only, and column 5.4
includes the measure of local population described above.
Across the four speciÖcations in Table 5, exclusive agents are subject to more complaints per
year of experience (p < 0:01) and complaints per year increases with years of experience (p <
0:01). Without controlling for individual agentsí marketshares, one additional year of experience is
associated with an additional 0.01 to 0.02 complaints per year.
We expect our estimates to be a lower bound on the true e§ect of experience. The longer an
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agent has been in business, the greater the proportion of ìbad applesî in his cohort that has been
weeded out through disciplinary actions. Because we observe complaints only for agents licensed
as of 2010, complaints against these bad agents are not included and this may bias the estimates
towards zero. Client attrition may also attenuate estimates of the e§ect of agent experience.24
5 Alternative explanations
Although our empirical Öndings are consistent with the simple model of price-taking experts pre-
sented in Section 1, we also consider the following alternative explanations: agent sorting between
Örm types, consumer heterogeneity, and di§erences in Örmsí ìdeep pocketsî and reporting rates.
5.1 Agent sorting
One might ask: Do Örms using exclusive agents systematically hire less honest agents? This
seems unlikely. Firms using exclusive agents typically have established screening processes for new
salespeople (e.g. applications, background checks, and interviews), whereas independent agents
establish their own practices and are not subject to this initial screening. Moreover, given the
screening process at the large branded Örms, dishonest exclusive agents who are Öred from one Örm
are unlikely to gain employment at another Örm using exclusive agents. Instead, they can move
into independent sales. Thus, the pool of independent agents may include former exclusive agents
who were terminated due to misconduct.
It is also unlikely that the disparity in misconduct rates is driven by honest exclusive agents
transitioning to become independent operators after accumulating industry experience, leaving
more dishonest agents in the pool of exclusive agents. Although we cannot see these career tran-
sitions directly, this movement would result in relatively young exclusive agents and relatively old
24The following example illustrates this potential. Suppose that there is no client attrition and an agent acquires
10 clients each year so that, in ten years, a new agent acquires 100 clients. If the chance of receiving a complaint is 1%
per client per year, then an agent with ten years of experience (in expectation) receives one complaint. In an agentís
twentieth year, he has 200 clients and expects two complaints. Thus, without attrition, the number of complaints
per year does not depend on experience. Now consider the role of client attrition. Over the past ten years, an agent
with twenty years of experience acquires the same number of clients as an agent with only ten years of experience.
However, due to attrition, the number of clients that he retains from his Örst ten years is now less than the number
of clients from the more recent decade. Thus, assuming that the chance of a complaint is still 1% per client per year,
we expect the ratio of complaints per year of the agent with twenty years of experience to be less than the ratio of
the agent with ten years of experience. Thus, we underestimate the true e§ect of experience on complaints.
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independent experts. However, on average, exclusive agents have been licensed signiÖcantly longer
than independent agents (Table 3; p < 0:01).
Evidence also suggests that the disparity is not driven by out-of-state agents whose misconduct
might be di¢cult to detect because of distance. There are signiÖcantly more out-of-state indepen-
dent sellers, relative to exclusive agents (Table 3; p < 0:01). Moreover, the regression presented in
column 4.3 excludes out-of-state agents and still estimates a large di§erence between agent types
(p < 0:01).
Are bad agents being detected and Öred by the Örms using exclusive agents? Although not
directly observable in the data, this sorting would work against our predicted e§ect. That is,
we would expect higher complaint rates for independent agents if these Örms included dishonest
(former) exclusive agents.
Agents might also sort geographicallyóone might wonder if di§erences in agentsí behavior
result from di§erences in local competitive landscapes. An average Texas ZIP code contains 31
independent agents (standard deviation of 52) and 19 exclusive agents (standard deviation of 34),
and approximately 84% of ZIP codes in Texas contain at least one of each agent type. Given that
both agents and customers are likely to transact across ZIP codes, we construct another measure
of local competition. We identify all ZIP codes within 25-miles of an agentís business address and
count the total number of agents within that radius. Overall, exclusive and independent agents face
similar volume and types of competitors: for both independent and exclusive agents, approximately
38% of agents within a 25-mile radius are exclusive and 62% are independent.
5.2 Customer heterogeneity
In this section, we explore the consequences of heterogeneity in the population of buyers. Using both
formal theory and empirical evidence, we argue that the matching of particularly savvy customers
to independent agents (or vice versa) cannot fully rationalize the di§erence in observed misconduct
rates.
To consider the impact of savvy consumers on the market equilibrium, we introduce ìconnois-
seurî consumers into the formal model in Section 1.25 Connoisseurs are deÖned as consumers who
25Adding connoisseurs is equivalent to introducing some exogenous probability that a consumer knows the appro-
priate product.
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are perfectly informed about the appropriateness of the recommended product and, therefore, only
and always buy from an expert who recommends R. We assume that experts cannot distinguish
a connoisseur from a regular customeróotherwise, experts would always suggest R to those con-
sumers and regular consumers would be una§ected. For simplicity, assume that agentsí types are
Öxed.
Suppose that there is a mass = of connoisseurs in the market. Now, experts enjoy a higher
(or lower) expected payo§ for suggesting R (or W ). Consider the probability of misconduct in a
market with connoisseurs:
Pr
%
(1& =) !b#W & k"& =k ' (1& =) b#R + =#R& = F !(1& =) b !#W & #R"& =#R" ( s,(b)
As expected, holding the buy rate Öxed, misconduct is decreasing in =.
Now, the buy rate for non-connoisseur consumers is
Pr
!
sV W + (1& s)V R ' 0" = 1&G# s
(1& s)
$
( b,(s)
Figure 5 plots the market-wide misconduct and buy rate when we introduce some mass = of
connoisseur consumers, and we can compare this market against one with no such customers (i.e.,
when = = 0): In this setting, it is the misconduct curveóthe inverse of the market-wide supply
s", (b)óthat changes. Intuitively, with the introduction of connoisseur consumers, the expected
payo§ to misconduct is reduced in two ways: Örst, experts face a greater chance of being caught
when suggesting W ; and, second, experts are more likely to be rewarded with a purchase when
they suggest R: That is, the presence of connoisseur consumers provides both a stick and carrot to
entice more experts towards appropriate recommendations. Graphically, the line representing the
inverse of market-wide level of misconduct in the presence of connoisseur consumers
'
s,>0 (b)
!1
(
lies above the misconduct curve when connoisseurs are not in the market
'
s,=0 (b)
!1
(
: The new
equilibrium with connoisseur consumers is characterized by less overall misconduct and a higher
market-wide buy rate.26 This yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Increasing the mass of connoisseur consumers decreases misconduct.
26 If connoisseur consumers engage only with exclusive agents, then industry-level misconduct decreases relative to
the baseline, but exclusive agents still engage in relatively more misconduct than independent agents.
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Although proprietary data on individual agentsí clients are not available, we proxy for consumer
awareness using demographic data for the populations near agentsí business addresses. For this
empirical exercise, we assume that employment in the Önance, banking or insurance industry is
correlated with knowledge of insurance needs and measure the proportion of the local population
that is employed in the Önancial sector. We match ZIP codes within 25 miles of an agentís business
address to employment statistics in the 2010 County Business Pattern data from the U.S. Census
Bureau.27
Using the same control variables as in Table 4, we augment equation 1 with the measure of the
local populationís employment in Önance.28 The coe¢cient on employment in Önance is positive
in all speciÖcations, but varies in terms of magnitude and statistical signiÖcance. Importantly,
inclusion of the measure of consumer awareness has little impact on the main coe¢cient of interestó
exclusive agents are associated with more justiÖed complaints than independent agents. We also
consider consumersí education levels using the percentage of the nearby population who completed
college and Önd similar results.
5.3 Deep pockets and reporting rates
One might be concerned that customers of branded companies are more likely to Öle a complaint due
to the Örmsí perceived ìdeep pockets.î In this section, we explore this possibility and argue that it
cannot fully explain the observed di§erences between complaints against exclusive and independent
agents.
If the cost of Öling is very low, then almost every discovered abuse should be reportedóindeed,
even customers who fail to detect any misconduct should contact the regulator for a costless (to
them) review of the transaction.29 However, if there exists some material cost of Öling a complaint,
then customers of exclusive experts will report suspected misconduct more often if they expect
a higher payo§ from a successful complaint, relative to the payo§ from a complaint about an
independent seller. In this case, even if exclusive and independent experts are equally ethical,
27To calculate total employment in the Önancial sector, we multiplied the mid-point of an employment size class
with the number of establishments in that class.
28For brevity, since the coe¢cient estimates vary little from those reported in Table 4, the full table of results is
omitted here.
29Empirically, the reporting cost is quite low, but not zero. Customers can complete a form on the TDI website
in a matter of minutes. Moreover, insurance policies must list contact information for Öling a complaint.
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exclusive experts will face more complaints.
A simple comparison of conviction rates suggests that ìdeep pocketsî cannot rationalize the
observed di§erence in complaint rates. If exclusive and independent agents are equally (un)ethical
and customers complain about exclusive agents at a higher rate, then the conviction rateóthe
ratio of justiÖed complaints to total complaintsówill be lower for exclusive agents.30 However, the
observed conditional conviction rates are, in fact, quite similar: 0.38 for exclusive agents versus 0.40
for independent agents. Therefore, there is little evidence that di§erent reporting rates explain the
large di§erences in exclusive and independent justiÖed sales complaints. Similarly, there is little
support for the claim that independent agents are more skilled at avoiding detection.
Moreover, according to the TDI, insurance companies often work directly with unhappy cus-
tomers to resolve issues and discourage them from contacting the regulator.31 Insurance companies
using exclusive agents have a structure that is particularly well-suited to diverting complaintsóin
general, branch and regional managers, as well as telephone customer service agents, can adjust
policies or payments in response to customersí claims. In contrast, customers of independent ex-
perts may have little recourse before contacting the regulator. As a result, we might expect observed
complaint rates for exclusive agents to represent a lower bound on actual misconduct.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies how the level of misconduct in expert services markets with price-taking advisors
varies across di§erent organizations. We propose a formal model in which price-taking experts
extract surplus through increased malfeasance. Using data from the insurance regulator in Texas,
we Önd support for the modelís hypotheses. Namely, exclusive experts working for large branded
Örms are more likely to be the subject of a complaint, relative to independent experts, and experts
with more experience are the subject of more complaints per year. Disparities across types of
organizations and experience levels are not readily explained by di§erences in market share.
Our research relates to the current discussion of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 and the conáict of interest rules proposed by the U.S. Department of
Labor. Currently, regulations distinguish between two types of investment experts and hold them
30A formal analysis supporting this intuition is available from the authors.
31We learned this through telephone conversations with sta§ at the TDI.
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to di§erent standards of conduct. Registered investment advisors are held to a ìÖduciary standardî
that requires them to disclose all conáicts and provide the client with the most appropriate recom-
mendation. In contrast, investment brokers are held to a lower ìsuitability standardî that requires
them to provide the client with a recommendation that is consistent with their needs, but not
necessarily the most appropriate. According to SEC research, many customers are unaware of the
di§ering standards and believe that both advisors operate under the higher standard of conduct.32
Our study can inform the policy debate. Brokers often work for large branded companies,
whereas registered investment advisors are often independent. We Önd that experts working in
large branded Örms are already more likely to extract surplus through misconduct. Thus, holding
these brokers to a lower standard may exacerbate consumer harm.
In the same report, the SEC suggests that investor education is needed. Our formal model
highlights the potential beneÖts of increased consumer awarenessóthe presence of many informed
customers can reduce market-wide misconduct.
Finally, if more experienced advisors are more likely to take advantage of customers, the stan-
dards of conduct could vary across experience levels; however, to our knowledge, this type of
professional standard has not yet been explicitly discussed by the regulator.
32U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2011. ìStudy on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers.î Available
online as of 20 September 2013: http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyÖnal.pdf
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Hypothesis 1 Exclusive experts are more likely to engage in misconduct than independent experts.
Proof. This proof formalizes the results in Figure 1. Recall that F (%) is the same for both Örm
types and that, since 1 > 1; GE (%) < GI (%) for all s 2 (0; 1) : For any expert type, b (s) is strictly
decreasing in s: in a market without misconduct, customers always buy (b (0) = 1) and, when
experts always engage in misconduct, customers never buy (b (1) = 0) :
DeÖne the inverse of the misconduct function as q (%) ( s (b)!1 : Since s (b) is strictly increasing
and continuous, so too is q (%) : In addition, if customers never buy, then experts never engage in
misconduct (q (0) = 0) and if customers always buy, then experts engage in misconduct (q (1) > 0) :
A unique, interior equilibrium follows from: (1) the continuity of b (%) and q (%); (2) the ordering
of end point values, b (0) = 1 > q(0) = 0 and b(1) = 0 < q (1) ; and (3) the strict monotonicity of
b (%) and q (%).
To compare organizations, recall that GE (%) < GI (%) for all interior values of s. That is, for all
interior points and for a given level of misconduct, exclusive experts face a higher buy rate than
independent experts (b"E > b
"
I) : This implies that the misconduct rate of exclusive experts is higher
than that of independent experts (s"E(b
") > s"I(b
")) because s (b) is strictly increasing.
Hypothesis 2 More error-prone experts are less likely to engage in misconduct.
Proof. This proof formalizes the results in Figure 2. Note that Gh (%) is increasing in the error
rate h: Holding Öxed the misconduct rate s, the buy rate bh (s) is decreasing in h for s < 1:
The misconduct rate is una§ected by the introduction of error-prone experts since
Pr
!
b#W & k ' (1& h) b#R + h !b#W & k"" = F !b !#W & #R"" ( sh (b) = s(b)
Following arguments presented for Hypothesis 1, equilibrium misconduct s"h (b
") is decreasing
in the error rate h:
Hypothesis 3 Increasing the mass of connoisseur consumers decreases misconduct.
Proof. This proof formalizes the results in Figure 5. Let = describes the mass of connoisseur
consumers in the market. DeÖne the inverse of the market-wide misconduct function as q, (%) (
s, (b)
!1 , and note that q, (%) is strictly increasing and continuous in s:
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The buy rate in the presence of connoisseur consumers (b, (s)) is strictly decreasing in s: if
experts never engage in misconduct, then customers always buy (b, (0) = 1) and if experts always
engage in misconduct, then customers never buy (b, (1) = 0) :
Consider the condition under which experts would not engage in misconduct: s, (b) = 0 requires
that (1& =) b !#W & #R"&=#R = 0; since F (0) = 0: This implies that b > 0 and, therefore, when
the market includes some connoisseur consumers, even some positive buy rate yields a market with
no misconduct.
The inverse of the market-wide misconduct function with connoisseur consumers lies above the
original misconduct function q,>0 (0) > q,=0 (0) for all values of b: However, conditional on a given
level of misconduct, the buy rate is unchanged by the presence of connoisseurs (b,>0(s) = b,=0(s)).
Therefore, in equilibrium, market-wide misconduct declines with the presence of more connoisseur
consumers.
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Figure 1: Market-wide misconduct Figure 2: Market-wide misconduct with 
error-prone experts
Figure 3: Complaints per agent by agent type
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Figure 4: Distribution of experience of agents with justified complaints by agent type
Figure 5: Market-wide misconduct with connoisseur consumers
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Nature of Complaint Description Justified Unjustified Total
Agent Mishandling Improper customer sales or service practices. 836 2421 3257
Churning
Inducing a customer to use the cash value of an
existing policy to purchase a new policy from the
same insurance company, resulting in another
commission for the agent.
66 39 105
Commissions Misrepresentation or unauthorized modification of theagent's commission rate. 73 190 263
Conversion Retaining a customer's premium and providing thecustomer with fictitious insurance documents. 629 39 668
Improper Inducements
Offering pay, favors, advantage or other valuable
rewards (not offered in the insurance contract) as
inducement to enter into the insurance or annuities
contract. 
37 10 47
Misleading Advertising
Making, publishing or disseminating public
announcements or advertisements containing untrue
or deceptive statements
190 57 247
Misrepresentation
Making untrue statement of facts, failing to state
critical facts, making misleading statements or
misstatements of the law, or failing to disclose a
matter required by law to be disclosed.
967 1783 2750
Tie-In Sales
Refusing to sell or renew a client's specific insurance
policy unless another policy is also purchased from
the agent.
3 0 3
Twisting
Inducing a customer to use the cash value of an
existing policy to purchase a new policy from a
different insurance company, resulting in another
commission for the agent.
20 28 48
Unauthorized Acts Buying, modifying, or selling a customer's policywithout the customer's consent. 943 135 1078
Total Complaints 3764 4702 8466
Table 1: Complaints against sales agents  - Reasons, description and counts
Exclusive Independent 
Life Insurance Only Total Premiums Written in millions $ 2,618 6,598
Average per Agent in thousands $ 50,220 57,858
Marketshare in % 28 72
Annuities Only Total Premiums Written in millions $ 1,952 15,974
Average per Agent in thousands $ 37,444 140,076
Marketshare in % 11 89
Life Insurance and 
Annuities Total Premiums Written in millions $ 4,570 22,572
Average per Agent in $ 87,664 197,934
Marketshare in % 17 83
Table 2: Market share by product and firm type
Agent Type
Note:  Average premiums per agent were calculated using the total number of agents, by type, 
licensed to sell both life insurance and annuities in 2010.
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
10.558 7.894 6.976 6.841
0.326 0.469 0.477 0.499
0.017 0.131 0.008 0.090
0.716 0.451 0.822 0.382
Agent Years Licensed
Texas Non-Resident (indicator)
Professional Designation (indicator)
One License Type Only (indicator)
Local population (25 miles) in thousands 11.912 9.009 11.902 8.720
Table 3: Agents in Texas by agent type -  Summary Statistics
n = 52,131 n = 114,038
Note:  These data exclude agents for whom license dates were not available; * ZIP code population data 
are available only for agents who are residents of Texas.
Exclusive agents Independent agents
Dependent variable: Equals 1 if agent has received a justified complaint, 0 otherwise
Odds 
Ratio
Odds 
Ratio
Odds 
Ratio
Odds 
Ratio
Exclusive Agent 0.551*** 1.735 0.536*** 1.709 0.561*** 1.752 0.551*** 1.735
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.064)
Agent Years Licensed 0.089*** 1.093 0.072*** 1.075 0.069*** 1.071 0.069*** 1.071
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Texas Non-Resident -1.918*** 0.147 -1.883*** 0.152
(0.121) (0.124)
Professional Designation -0.245 0.783 -0.236 0.790 -0.039 0.962 -0.123 0.884
(0.296) (0.296) (0.298) (0.326)
One License Type Only 0.727*** 2.069 0.720*** 2.054 0.742*** 2.100 0.749*** 2.115
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.075)
Local population (25mi.) -0.011*** 0.989
(0.003)
Constant -6.353*** -5.984*** -5.972*** -5.858***
(0.085) (0.091) (0.091) (0.101)
# of observations
Table 4: Justified complaints
All agents
All agents with 
>3 years 
experience
Agents with 
Texas residency
4.4
Agents with Texas 
residency
69,423
4.1 4.2 4.3
166,169 113,701 72,918
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Logit coefficient and variance estimates are corrected 
using the rare-events correction of King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b). *** denotes p < 0.01
Table 5 - Justified complaints per year
Dependent variable:  Justified complaints per year of experience
5.25.1
 Agents with >3 
years experience
 Agents with  3 to 
15 years of 
experience
5.3
 Texas resident 
agents with  3 to 
15 years of 
experience
5.4
 Texas resident 
agents with  3 to 
15 years of 
experience
Exclusive Agent 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
Agent Years Licensed 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)(0.000)
Texas Non-Resident -0.189*** -0.305***
(0.024)(0.012)
Professional Designation -0.039 -0.228 -0.011 -0.019
(0.141) (0.034) (0.037)(0.033)
One License Type Only 0.079*** 0.130*** 0.082*** 0.084***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.001***
(0.000)
Local population (25mi.)
Constant -0.801*** -1.293*** -0.782*** -0.782***
(0.024) (0.059) (0.024) (0.025)
# of observations 113,701 84,628 72,918 69,423
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.*** denotes p < 0.01
